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BRIAN GETTLER*
An examination of the shifting boundaries of monetary space in nineteenth-
century Quebec underlines the importance of currency to the processes of colonial 
expansion and state formation. As the Hudson’s Bay Company’s imperially backed 
corporate currency was gradually replaced with money that drew its legitimacy 
from colonial governors and legislatures, regions previously beyond the pale 
of settler society were reconceptualized as being part of the political space of 
“Canada.” This article examines the monetary experience of First Nations in 
Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, tracing the structural changes to the monetary system 
wrought by the replacement of British claims to sovereignty, embodied in the fur 
trade, by those based on settler colonialism. The region’s Indigenous population 
played a central role in this transformation.
Un examen des frontières mouvantes de l’espace monétaire au Québec du 
XIXe siècle souligne l’importance de la devise pour l’expansion coloniale et la 
formation de l’État. À mesure que la devise au soutien impérial de la Compagnie 
de la Baie d’Hudson a été remplacée par de l’argent tirant sa légitimité des 
gouverneurs et des législatures de la colonie, les régions jusqu’alors en retrait 
de la société coloniale ont été reconceptualisées dans l’espace politique du 
« Canada ». Cet article examine l’expérience monétaire des Premières Nations 
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du Saguenay–Lac-Saint-Jean, retraçant les changements structurels au système 
monétaire né du remplacement des revendications de la Grande-Bretagne en 
matière de souveraineté, incarnées par le commerce de la fourrure, par celles du 
colonialisme de peuplement. La population autochtone de la région a joué un rôle 
central dans cette transformation.
DURING THE nineteenth century, present-day Quebec consisted of two distinct, 
though sometimes overlapping, monetary spaces. The first – the steadily growing 
area inhabited by colonists – was home to official state accounting currency of 
first British and later Canadian origin alongside a wide variety of circulating forms 
of cash.1 The second – the region demographically dominated by First Nations, 
in which fur traders and missionaries provided the primary permanent or semi-
permanent Euro-Canadian presence – boasted a privately defined and maintained 
commercial currency based on the beaver pelt, which fur traders employed with 
Aboriginal hunter-trappers but not with other Euro-Canadians.2 The fortunes of 
these two monetary spaces shifted during the period, with beaver currency having 
disappeared from much of the region by the early years of the twentieth century.3 
While this change may at first appear inconsequential, the differing historical 
trajectories of these two “territorial currencies” point to a much larger process: 
the shift from older forms of territorial management and European claims to 
sovereignty, exercised in part by royally sanctioned monopolistic corporations, to 
their modern counterparts, almost exclusively based in the Victorian nation-state. 
Monetary circulation, then, played an important role in the process by which the 
colonial and later federal state assumed the pretension of territorial sovereignty 
1 Although the state required that such currency be used in all official accounts, its use was limited for much 
of the nineteenth century to ledgers and mental calculation as individuals, businesses, and, indeed, the 
state employed diverse media of exchange minted elsewhere in the Americas and in Europe when cash 
was required. On the wide variety of money in circulation, see A. B. McCullough, Money and Exchange in 
Canada to 1900 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1984).
2 This typology is based on the situation in the eastern subarctic and refers specifically to those populations 
indigenous to the region. Although it suggests that a similar situation may have existed further west, it does 
not claim that the monetary system functioned in precisely the same way there nor that all Aboriginal hunter-
trappers were paid in beaver currency alone. Indeed, documentary evidence from the western subarctic 
suggests that Iroquois, Nipissing, Ojibwa, and Métis freemen demanded payment for part of their hunts 
in cash or bills that were negotiable in Canada. See Alice M. Johnson, ed., Saskatchewan Journals and 
Correspondence, 1795-1802 (London: Hudson’s Bay Record Society, 1967), vol. 26, p. 206; Ted Binnema 
and Gerhard J. Ens, eds., The Hudson’s Bay Company: Edmonton House Journals, Correspondence and 
Reports, 1806-1821 (Calgary: Alberta Records Publication Board, Historical Society of Alberta, 2012), 
pp. 42-44. The author wishes to thank an anonymous reviewer for underlining this distinction between the 
eastern and western subarctic.
3 The present article uses the term “monetary space” to refer to that geographical area in which a particular 
system of currency (sometimes constituted by co-existing but largely co-exclusive monetary forms) is 
predominant. This draws on Eric Helleiner’s concept of “territorial currency.” According to Helleiner, 
despite historiographical emphasis on the 1648 Peace of Westphalia as signalling the birth of the modern 
sovereign state, money only came to serve this new master during the nineteenth century through the 
exclusion of foreign currencies from national, political space, the creation of consequential amounts state-
backed, low-value coins, and the homogenization of official circulating currency. See Eric Helleiner, 
The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2003). Although this article largely accepts Helleiner’s vision, it argues that, although the 
nation-state certainly sought to monopolize control over the monetary system in nineteenth-century British 
North America, it was not the first institution to have done so.
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previously asserted by the French and British Crowns through chartered companies 
such as the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC). This article ties these political 
changes to alterations in the structure of the monetary system in subarctic Quebec, 
in particular as they affected the Innu (Montagnais), the Aboriginal population of 
Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, who experienced the substitution of the state for the HBC 
as the pillar of the monetary system during the middle of the nineteenth century. 
As did the reserve system, this process of currency replacement formed one of the 
visible ways through which the political community centred on the St. Lawrence 
valley and the lower Great Lakes expanded to engulf and to dominate the vast 
majority of present-day Canada’s territory and the population already living there.
 During the mid-nineteenth century, the state in British North America, as in 
the United States and much of Western Europe, came to occupy an increasingly 
central role in political and economic life.4 In addition to its growing involvement 
in sectors such as education, policing, and transportation, the state also pursued 
monetary standardization, symbolically and functionally integrating colonial 
and later national markets and polities in the process.5 When considering the 
imposition of an exclusive monetary standard by the state during the nineteenth 
century, Canadian historiography concentrates on long-colonized areas while 
also focusing solely on physical media (notes and coins). This approach tends to 
overestimate the importance of mid-century reforms in uniting national markets, 
as colonists in these regions had long made use of unitary abstract money (first the 
French livre, later Halifax currency, and finally the Canadian dollar) to evaluate 
the heterogeneous supply of coin in circulation.6 Indeed, under both the French 
and English regimes, authorities dictated the abstract terms in which colonial 
residents expressed value, symbolically uniting the colonies both economically 
and politically.7 Despite this abstract unification, colonists in the region continued 
to employ multiple forms of foreign and domestic cash (both coins and bank 
notes) through 1871, when Parliament passed the Uniform Currency Act, thereby 
4 For the prototypical historical study of state formation, see Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: 
English State Formation as Cultural Revolution (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985). On state formation 
in the British North American context, see Allan Greer and Ian Radforth, eds., Colonial Leviathan: State 
Formation in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).
5 For the Canadian context, see Bruce Curtis, “From the Moral Thermometer to Money: Metrological Reform 
in Pre-Confederation Canada,” Social Studies of Science, vol. 28, no. 4 (August 1998), pp. 547-570. See 
also Robert Garson, “Counting Money: The US Dollar and American Nationhood, 1781-1820,” Journal of 
American Studies, vol. 35, no. 1 (2001), pp. 21-46; Helleiner, The Making of National Money.
6 On the wide variety of coin in circulation, see Angela Redish, “Why Was Specie Scarce in Colonial 
Economies? An Analysis of the Canadian Currency, 1796-1830,” Journal of Economic History, vol. 44, 
no. 3 (September 1984), pp. 713-728. For a theoretical perspective that accentuates the immaterial role of 
money as a unit of account, in contrast to the general emphasis that both the economic literature and the 
historiography place on its physical function as a medium of exchange or as a store of value, see Geoffrey 
Ingham, The Nature of Money (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004).
7 On the French livre in Canada, see McCullough, Money and Exchange in Canada to 1900, pp. 29-30. On 
the implementation of Halifax currency following the Conquest, see Gilles Paquet and Jean-Pierre Wallot, 
Un Québec moderne, 1760-1840. Essai d’histoire économique et sociale (Montreal: Éditions Hurtubise 
HMH, 2007), p. 208. In 1853, the legislature of the Province of Canada adopted the pound, dollar, shilling, 
pence, and cent as official units of currency. In 1857, it effectively ended the use of the Halifax system 
and sterling notation in the colony by requiring that all accounts submitted to the state, as well as those 
kept internally by the state itself, be in dollars and cents (McCullough, Money and Exchange in Canada, 
pp. 106-110).
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effectively creating a single, consolidated system of abstract and physical currency 
in southern Canada for the first time.8
 Although this constituted a major symbolic change in relatively heavily 
colonized regions, the creation of a system based on a single physical medium 
and abstract money did not involve the remaking of political authority in southern 
Canada, even if the federal rather than the colonial state sustained the monetary 
system. In much of the subarctic, however, this change spelled the end of a currency 
that had been in use since at least the late seventeenth century, and it transferred 
ultimate political authority over the region from monopolistic companies to the 
emerging nation-state. This earlier monetary system had been developed by 
European traders and Aboriginal hunter-trappers as a mutually intelligible means 
of evaluating manufactured goods, provisions, and furs, drawing its force from 
the ties that bound the two groups together over generations. As the British 
North American state of the mid-to-late nineteenth century expanded beyond the 
relatively limited zone of European settlement in the St. Lawrence valley and the 
lower Great Lakes, it built upon institutions that already existed in the regions it 
entered, many of which were a legacy of the fur trade. Thus the monetary system 
of the subarctic underwent changes in the nineteenth century that were predicated 
on conceptual continuity (the value of money residing in the faith placed in the 
issuer’s ability to repay) while signalling a fundamentally altered universe in 
which the central political authority was no longer the same.
 This article draws much of its inspiration from the heterodox theory of money. 
In general terms, this approach differs from orthodox economics, which places 
emphasis on money’s “neutrality” and the primacy of its exchange function, by 
underlining money’s social nature, through its role as a unit of account and its 
involvement in credit relations.9 Orthodox economics posits an account of the 
origin of money that draws on “conjectural history” as practised during the 
Scottish Enlightenment. Basing their model on observations of the contemporary 
world, eighteenth-century Scottish thinkers, including notably Adam Smith, felt 
themselves capable of describing processes that had gone undocumented by the 
historical record.10 This methodology gave rise to the “barter fable,” which, in its 
simplest form, holds that, following a period during which barter provided the 
only means of exchanging goods and services, humans realized that by accepting 
a single, inherently valuable commodity as a medium of exchange they could 
8 Curtis, “From the Moral Thermometer to Money,” p. 554. While this law did make some foreign coin, 
notably British gold sovereigns and United States gold eagles, legal tender, the practical importance of this 
clause appears to have been negligible since very few gold coins circulated in Canada. A variety of foreign 
copper coins of small denomination also circulated well into the twentieth century (Helleiner, The Making 
of National Money, pp. 32, 39, and 116).
9 For an overview of the differences in interpretation between the two schools, see L. Randall Wray, “State 
Money,” International Journal of Political Economy, vol. 32, no. 3 (October 1, 2002), pp. 23-40. For 
several key works in the heterodox approach to money, see Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, trans. 
Tom Bottomore and David Frisby (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, [1900] 1978); Georg Friedrich 
Knapp, The State Theory of Money (London: Macmillan & Co., [1905] 1924); Viviana A. Zelizer, The 
Social Meaning of Money (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Ingham, The Nature of Money.
10 On Scottish conjectural historians, see Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge 
in Sciences of Wealth and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 214-263.
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greatly increase market efficiency.11 This description, however, fails to account 
for what scholars now know of money’s historical genesis. According to the 
heterodox theory, based on more recent research than its orthodox counterpart, 
money draws its power neither from its precious metal content nor from its 
superior efficiency vis-à-vis barter, but from its acceptance by political authorities 
(for example, the state) and private individuals as a means of settling debt. Indeed, 
as the historical data on its initial development in the ancient Near East make clear, 
money neither requires physical form nor functions primarily in market-based 
exchange relations.12 The present article draws on heterodox theory to emphasize 
the role of political authority in the creation and maintenance of currency, while 
simultaneously signalling the primacy of debt to the use of money.
 This article also draws on the international historiography that, since the 
middle of the twentieth century, has focused on debt in pre-industrial production 
in connection with the “truck system.” Businesses that practised truck paid some 
portion of wages in goods at stores operated either directly by the company or by 
a close commercial partner. The historiography tends to suggest that this system, 
which was widespread in Great Britain, portions of British North America, the 
United States, and elsewhere in the north Atlantic during the nineteenth century, 
potentially served two purposes. First, truck allowed employers to pay wages 
that, due to the higher-than-market price charged in company stores, were 
inferior to their nominal value. Second, the historiography notes that payment 
in goods overcame scarcity of cash.13 The first of these two factors played a role 
in Parliament’s efforts to end the truck system in nineteenth-century Britain. The 
Truck Act of 1831, a law that sought to outlaw the system, arose from a double 
motive on the part of MPs who sought both to increase the state’s seigniorage 
revenue and to protect workers from exploitation at the hands of their employers. 
By increasing the amount of official currency in circulation at the expense of 
truck, the state sought to decrease the difference in the nominal and real value of 
wages earned while generating revenue from the amount of official currency in 
use – revenue arising from the difference between currency’s nominal value and 
the lesser value of precious metals it actually contained.14
11 This critique of barter as the basis for money is presented in Jean-Michel Servet, “La fable du troc,” Dix-
huitième siècle, no. 26 (1994), pp. 103-115.
12 Ancient currency in the Near East (c. 3000 to 500 BCE) served to assess rents and taxes essential to the 
region’s command economy. Individuals paid these fees in kind, either in barley or silver, and secular and 
religious authorities subsequently redistributed them. In this way, money served to calculate the social 
obligations of landowners, labourers, clerics, and the nobility. In this system, the standard unit of account, 
the Mesopotamian shekel, did not correspond to any media valued for its precious metal content, but instead 
formed the state-established correlation between the value of silver and barley that structured the temples’ 
and palaces’ collection and redistribution of commodities (Ingham, The Nature of Money, pp. 93-97).
13 For descriptions of truck systems in both Britain and Quebec that exhibited both of these characteristics, see 
George W. Hilton, “The British Truck System in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 65, no. 3 (June 1957), pp. 237-256; Rosemary E. Ommer, “The Truck System in Gaspé, 1822-77,” 
Acadiensis, vol. 19, no. 1 (Fall 1989), pp. 91-114.
14 On Parliament’s efforts, see Elaine Tan, “Scrip as Private Money, Monetary Monopoly, and the Rent-
seeking State in Britain,” Economic History Review, vol. 64, no. 1 (February 2011), pp. 237-255; G. W. 
Hilton, “The Truck Act of 1831,” Economic History Review, vol. 10, no. 3 (April 1958), pp. 470-479.
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 While Parliament applied the Truck Act to Britain, it did no such thing 
in the colonies. This may have, at least in part, been due to the characteristic 
remoteness of truck outside Great Britain.15 In the North American context, the 
historiography focuses primarily on truck as practised in remote natural-resource-
based industries such as fishing, mining, and lumbering and suggests that the 
distance from population centres at which these industries operated influenced the 
state’s decision to overlook the theoretically illegal private monetary systems that 
they spawned.16 Notions of race also influenced colonial truck, leading in several 
cases to the creation of credit, payment, or monetary systems tailored to a specific 
racialized clientele.17
 While drawing inspiration from these studies, the present study also steps 
beyond them by analysing the geopolitical nature of the fur trade in nineteenth-
century British North America and the role played by company currency in 
manifesting British claims to sovereignty over parts of the subarctic. During this 
period, the HBC and its rivals held a theoretical or actual monopoly over much of 
the region’s fur market, functioning in many remote areas of the continent as the 
sole representative of the British Crown or the colonial government. By focusing 
on one part of the fur trade’s economic infrastructure and the political weight that 
it carried, this article expands on existing analyses of truck. The HBC’s two-tiered 
monetary system allowed the company to trade with its agents and the handful 
of other Euro-Canadians present in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean by way of the pound 
sterling or Halifax currency while dealing with the Innu in beaver currency alone. 
This practice separated colonizer from colonized and symbolically founded the 
company’s authority in its privileged relationship with London. Indeed, in contrast 
to private companies elsewhere, the HBC functioned as the state’s officially 
sanctioned representative, a status that legitimized the company’s monetary system 
while also contributing to the British Empire’s claims to sovereignty. This study 
also challenges the essentially orthodox conception of money, in which even the 
most original analyses of the fur trade are rooted, to argue that the HBC’s “made 
beaver” system was not simply “modernized barter,” but, through its introduction 
of time and an abstract unit of account to exchange relations, constituted authentic 
money.18 It traces the ways in which such money marked space and the influence 
15 It is important to note that, within Britain, the truck system often flourished in heavily populated and central 
regions such as the Midlands and Gloucestershire (Hilton, “The British Truck System in the Nineteenth 
Century,” p. 239).
16 For example, authorities in the United States often overlooked laws barring the private issue of currency 
in the case of truck practised in remote late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century mining and lumbering 
towns in the United States. See Richard H. Timberlake, “Private Production of Scrip-Money in the Isolated 
Community,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 19, no. 4 (November 1, 1987), pp. 437-447. For 
an example of a private monetary system in a remote British North American industry (lumbering), see 
Louise Dechêne, “Les entreprises de William Price (1810-1850) : scieries et chantiers,” Saguenayensia, 
vol.12, no. 4 (July-August 1970), pp. 82-85.
17 See, for example, Adrian Graves, “Truck and Gifts: Melanesian Immigrants and the Trade Box System 
in Colonial Queensland,” Past & Present, no. 101 (November 1983), pp. 87-124; Howard Johnson, “‘A 
Modified Form of Slavery’: The Credit and Truck Systems in the Bahamas in the Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth Centuries,” Comparative Studies in Society & History, vol. 28, no. 4 (October 1986), pp. 729-
753.
18 Frank Tough’s otherwise groundbreaking work on the Aboriginal economies of northern Manitoba provides 
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that it allowed the HBC to exert over the lives of the Innu. Here as elsewhere, 
however, Aboriginal peoples did not passively accept marginalization. Ultimately, 
their actions contributed to the process by which the state superseded both the 
HBC’s monetary system and its political dominance in the region.
The Fur Trade and the Political Power of Monopolies
Prior to the transfer to Canada of Rupert’s Land in 1870, the Hudson’s Bay 
Company held a royal charter that, in addition to monopoly trading rights, 
provided it with political and legal authority over much of North America. As time 
went by, the company took an increasingly liberal view of the region described 
by its charter,19 in the process acting to exclude competitors and to strengthen 
its claims to the monopolistic powers it exercised in commerce as well as in 
law.20 In this sense, the HBC formed a “company-state” in much the same way as 
other early modern and modern overseas trading corporations, most notably the 
East India Company.21 In addition to the HBC, several other large commercial 
ventures such as the Compagnie du Nord, the Compagnie de la Colonie, and the 
North West Company (NWC) struggled at one time or another for the control 
of the fur trade throughout much of the Canadian subarctic. Although ostensibly 
commercial enterprises alone, all of these companies, in at least certain instances, 
operated on the basis of government-furnished monopolies theoretically allowing 
them to purchase pelts in the absence of competition while also providing them 
with a certain measure of legal and political power within the region covered by 
their charter.
 For example, between 1802 and its fusion with the HBC in 1821, the Montreal-
based NWC leased monopoly rights from Lower Canada to the King’s Posts, a 
an excellent example of the importance of orthodox monetary theory to analyses of the fur trade. Tough 
labels the made beaver system “modernized barter,” despite quite rightly pointing out that the system 
allowed for credit relations through time. In this sense, monetary transactions simply cannot exist because 
barter potentially includes both goods and promises to pay. See Frank Tough, “As Their Natural Resources 
Fail”: Native People and the Economic History of Northern Manitoba, 1870-1930 (Vancouver: University 
of British Columbia Press, 1996), p. 268.
19 Furthermore, as legal scholar Hamar Foster notes, the HBC made this changing interpretation in the absence 
of a decision by any external legal body whatsoever: “The official corporate position came to be that their 
property included all the land drained by rivers flowing into Hudson’s Bay, a proposition which meant 
that, in the southwest, Rupert’s Land stretched all the way to the Rocky Mountains. And although many 
legal opinions were sought and obtained during the course of recurring disputes over the validity of their 
charter and the trading rights that went with it, neither issue was ever tested in court.” See Hamar Foster, 
“Long-Distance Justice: The Criminal Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts West of the Canadas, 1763-1859,” 
American Journal of Legal History, vol. 34, no. 1 (January 1990), p. 2.
20 It is important to note the theoretical distinction that existed between the company’s commercial and legal 
prerogatives. Whereas the HBC held a monopoly over trade with Aboriginal peoples, its legal powers only 
applied to individuals of European descent within the territory covered by its charter. On the company’s 
legal powers, see Russell Smandych and Rick Linden, “Administering Justice without the State: A Study of 
the Private Justice System of the Hudson’s Bay Company to 1800,” Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 
vol. 11 (1996), pp. 21-61.
21 On the ways in which the East India Company combined commerce and governance, in the process 
asserting British sovereignty while coming to occupy many of the roles that Weberian political theory tends 
to reserve for the state alone, see Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early 
Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2011) and “History 
and Historiography of the English East India Company: Past, Present, and Future!”, History Compass, 
vol. 7, no. 4 (2009), pp. 1146-1180.
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region roughly corresponding to present-day Saguenay-Lac St. Jean and including 
a portion of Charlevoix and the North Shore of the St. Lawrence. The French state 
had initially set aside these posts, also known as the King’s Domain, in the mid-
seventeenth century as a reserve in which settlement not directly tied to the fur 
trade or missionary work was prohibited. Over the nearly 200 years that followed, 
both the French and British Crowns either leased the exclusive right to trade in 
this region to commercial concerns or exploited the trade for their own profit.22 
Although the 1802 lease held by the NWC only formally applied to economic 
activities involving the region’s fur trade, fisheries, and lands, the colonial state 
essentially provided the company with complete authority over the King’s Posts 
by proclaiming a ban on the “intrusion, hindrance or molestation, by any Trader 
or Traders or any other Person or Persons whatsoever within the limits of the said 
Domain Lands and Posts, and the dependencies thereof.”23 From the Conquest, 
officials in the colony encouraged further independence on the part of lessees of 
the King’s Posts by appointing individuals from within their ranks Justice of the 
Peace for the District of Quebec, the judicial district within which the posts were 
situated.24 This effectively provided leaseholders with the authority to regulate 
legal disputes involving individuals of European descent within the King’s Posts 
as they saw fit.25 Thus, even in the absence of a royal charter, the NWC effectively 
ruled this region on behalf of the state.
 However, following the fusion of the NWC and the HBC in 1821, the new 
company (also known as the HBC) proved uninterested in renewing its rights to 
the King’s Domain, and in 1822 a new enterprise (the King’s Posts Company) 
acquired a 20-year lease to the region. The HBC, however, quickly decided that it 
had been mistaken in failing to pursue the lease with greater conviction. Working 
from the margins of the King’s Posts, it engaged its new competitor in a struggle 
for control of the fur trade in the region throughout the 1820s. This conflict ended 
with the purchase by the HBC of the King’s Posts Company’s lease in 1831.26 In 
this way, the King’s Domain in Lower Canada came to be functionally integrated 
22 On the creation of and changes to the region known as the King’s Posts, see Russel Bouchard, Le Saguenay 
des fourrures, 1534-1859 : histoire d’un monopole (Chicoutimi-Nord: Russel Bouchard, 1989), pp. 81-123 
and 165-170.
23 Canada, Report of the Public Archives for the Year 1921 (Ottawa: F. A. Acland, 1922), Appendix B: 
“Proclamations of the Governor of Lower Canada, 1792-1815,” p. 82.
24 For example, Thomas Dunn, one of the lessees of the posts, held this office from 1764, the year before he 
and John Gray leased them. See Pierre Tousignant and Jean-Pierre Wallot, “Dunn, Thomas” in Dictionary 
of Canadian Biography Online, http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?&id_nbr=2386 (retrieved 
April 27, 2012). In 1786, one of the new lessees, Alexander Grant, was appointed to the office. See Carol 
Whitfield, “Grant, Alexander” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, http://www.biographi.
ca/009004-119.01-e.php?&id_nbr=2427 (retrieved April 27, 2012). In 1822, William Goudie, who in the 
same year founded the King’s Posts Company to manage the region’s trade monopoly, was named Justice 
of the Peace. See Eileen Marcil, “Goudie, John” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, http://www.
biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?&id_nbr=2893 (retrieved April 27, 2012).
25 In general, criminal jurisdiction throughout Britain’s colonies and the United States at the turn of the 
nineteenth century did not yet apply to the Indigenous population. See Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: 
Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788-1836 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2010).
26 Jean-Paul Simard, “Onze annés de troubles dans les Postes du Roi,” Saguenayensia, vol. 10, no. 1 (January-
February 1968), pp. 2-5.
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into Rupert’s Land, the region over which the HBC claimed control as a result of 
its 1670 royal charter.27 By 1831, then, the company exerted its influence, both 
economically and politically, over the whole of the Canadian subarctic.
The Nature of Currency in the Subarctic Fur Trade
Shortly after European merchants had arrived on the shores of Hudson and James 
Bay during the late seventeenth century, transactions in the region came to be 
structured through the use of the beaver pelt as the standard of trade. The English, 
who, from 1670, traded under the auspices of the Hudson’s Bay Company, referred 
to this standard, which expressed the theoretical value of a single prime beaver 
pelt, as the “made beaver,” whereas French traders and their Montreal-based 
successors referred to it simply as the castor.28 Regardless of its name, the beaver 
provided participants in the fur trade with the means of expressing in abstract terms 
the value of all goods and services. It is important to note that beaver currency was 
first and foremost an abstract rather than a physical form of money, as it quickly 
came to lose any direct relationship that it may have initially had to the value of 
any given skin.29 However, it did occasionally circulate in physical form as either 
coins or stamped wooden sticks.30 Although several scholars have remarked on the 
existence of this monetary system, none have underlined its fundamental role in 
the creation of the debt-based fur trade, an institution that has received far more 
attention.31 Yet, without an abstract measure of value, the fur trade could only 
27 This claim had been strengthened by a law passed by the British Parliament in 1821 in which the post-
merger HBC was accorded “the exclusive Privilege of Trading with the Indians in all such Parts of North 
America as shall be specified in any such Grants or Licences respectively, not being Part of the Lands or 
Territories heretofore granted to the said Governor and Company of Adventurers of England trading to 
Hudson’s Bay, and not being Part of any of His Majesty’s Provinces in North America, or of any Lands or 
Territories belonging to the United States of America” (Great Britain, “An Act for regulating the fur trade, 
and establishing a criminal and civil jurisdiction within certain parts of North America,” July 2, 1821, 1-2 
George IV, cap. 66, p. 570, CIHM/ICMH Microfiche series, no. 47766).
28 Rich writes that, as early as 1684, traders and hunter-trappers “made” all goods and furs into beaver to 
express their value, thereby providing the name for the Hudson’s Bay Company’s abstract accounting 
currency: the made beaver. See E. E. Rich, The Fur Trade and the Northwest to 1857 (Toronto: McClelland 
& Stewart, 1967), p. 59.
29 As Louise Dechêne has noted in the context of the French regime, individuals neither saved skins nor 
employed them when purchasing goods as they did with metallic and paper money. See Louise Dechêne, 
Habitants et marchands de Montréal au XVIIe siècle (Montreal: Boréal, [1974] 1988), p. 135.
30 For circulation of the made beaver via coin and stamped wooden sticks, see Charles A. Bishop, The 
Northern Ojibwa and the Fur Trade: An Historical and Ecological Study (Toronto and Montreal: Holt, 
Reinhart and Winston, 1974), p. 82; Larry Gingras, “Medals and Tokens of the HBC,” The Beaver, vol. 48, 
no. 1 (summer 1968), pp. 36-43, and “Medals, Tokens and Paper Money of the Hudson’s Bay Company” 
(Canadian Numismatic Research Society, 1975), pp. 67-93. On beaver tokens issued by the North West 
Company in 1820, see Hudson’s Bay Company Archives [hereafter HBCA], “HBCA Information Sheet: 
HBC Fur Trade Tokens,” p. 2, http://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/archives/hbca/info_sheets/index.html (retrieved 
January 18, 2010).
31 In addition to Rich, The Fur Trade, see also Arthur J. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Trappers, 
Hunters, and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of Hudson Bay, 1660-1870 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, [1974] 1998), pp. 61-62; Arthur J. Ray and Donald Freeman, “Give Us Good Measure”: An 
Economic Analysis of Relations Between the Indians and the Hudson’s Bay Company Before 1763 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1978), pp. 54-55; Tough, “As Their Natural Resources Fail”, pp. 15, 268, and 
276-277. On the debt system, see Toby Morantz, “‘So Evil a Practice’: A Look at the Debt System in the 
James Bay Fur Trade” in Rosemary E. Ommer, ed., Merchant Credit and Labour Strategies in Historical 
Perspective (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1990), pp. 203-222.
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function through “straight barter.” Following the appearance of beaver currency 
and the simultaneous construction of permanent trading posts, Amerindians 
and merchants could begin to exchange goods against future promises to pay, 
recorded in the traders’ ledgers and, in principle, agreed upon by all parties to the 
transaction. Thus this particular form of money, like forts, provided the fur trade 
with the infrastructure necessary to develop an ongoing economic relationship 
between First Nations and international capital. On the relatively rare occasions 
that it circulated in physical form, beaver currency also visibly promoted the 
authority that issued it.32
 Although the NWC’s political and economic support was based in Montreal, 
the HBC had always drawn both forms of backing from the metropole, as its royal 
charter and the identity of its investors made the company a representative of the 
British Empire in a way that differed substantially from the resolutely colonial 
NWC.33 Despite these differences, both companies traded with Aboriginal peoples 
using beaver currency instead of either the British Empire’s standard money (the 
pound sterling) or the accounting currency used in the North American colonies 
(Halifax currency). In some regions, HBC employees and Amerindians continued 
to make use of this money in their dealings instead of either imperial or national 
currencies well into the twentieth century. Despite their similar natures, the HBC’s 
made beaver was not identical to the NWC’s castor in that the two currencies 
could only be used within the corporate network from which they originated. 
Furthermore, given that the vast majority of this money “circulated” in book form 
alone – that is, in company ledgers – and that the HBC, at least, attempted to 
maintain a strict separation of accounts between its different posts and districts, 
debits and credits calculated in beaver currency were tightly circumscribed within 
relatively small geographic units rather than across the whole of the territory in 
which the company traded. The rare coins that the HBC issued make this clear 
in that they bear the name of the district in which they were to be used.34 At first 
glance, then, it might appear inappropriate to characterize beaver currency as a 
territorial monetary system.
 However, in spite of corporate attempts through both ledgers and physical 
currency to restrict its use to single posts or within single districts, the made beaver 
32 Both the North-West Company and the Hudson’s Bay Company drew upon classical imperial iconography 
(Roman busts and laurel crowns, for example) and language (the HBC’s use of the Latin “pro pelle cutem” 
or “a skin for a skin”) while underlining the currency’s origins in the fur trade through depictions of beavers, 
stags, and other fur-bearing animals. For examples of coins, see North-West Company, Beaver Coin, 
1820, Bank of Canada, National Currency Collection, Ottawa, 1966.0160.01343.000 and Hudson’s Bay 
Company, Made Beaver, East Main District, c. 1865[?], British Museum, 1922,0306.1.
33 On the HBC’s political character throughout North America, see John S. Galbraith, The Hudson’s Bay 
Company as an Imperial Factor, 1821-1869 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957).
34 For example, two coins that the HBC most likely issued during the 1860s bear the engraving “HB E M” 
(Hudson Bay, East Main), one of the company’s districts in eastern James Bay. National Maritime Museum, 
Greenwich, London (UK), MEC2758, Hudson Bay Company 1 made beaver trading token, c. 1865, http://
collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/40198.html (retrieved March 25, 2012) and MEC2759, ½ made 
beaver trading token, c. 1865, http://collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/40199.html (retrieved 
March 25, 2012). The HBC issued similar coins for its St. Lawrence and Labrador Districts in the early 
twentieth century. See Gingras, “Medals, Tokens and Paper Money of the Hudson’s Bay Company,” 
pp. 83-85.
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provided the HBC and First Nations with the abstract means of evaluating furs and 
merchandise throughout the whole of the territory over which the company exerted 
control. Thus Aboriginal trappers who were “attached” to a given post might 
decide to travel great distances in search of higher prices for their furs or lower 
prices for their provisions, all the while using beaver currency to complete their 
transactions.35 In this sense, the made beaver was as much a territorial currency 
as those developed by colonies and nation-states across the globe through the 
late nineteenth century as it allowed the HBC to mark the regions it controlled 
through a unique and locally intelligible means of expressing value. The process, 
then, by which beaver currency gave way before the Canadian monetary system 
represents more than the disappearance of a pre-modern curiosity. Rather, it 
underlines the process through which the liberal democratic state came, over the 
course of the nineteenth century, to occupy an increasingly unassailable position 
as the only legitimate institutional expression of national political community.36 
It also suggests that the HBC and other chartered companies were central to the 
assertion of sovereignty by European crowns over much of the early modern and 
modern world.
The Advent of Large-Scale Colonization in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean
By the 1820s and 1830s, Lower Canada’s colonization movement had begun 
looking to Saguenay-Lac St. Jean as a source of fertile and unclaimed lands, thereby 
providing a means of preventing the emigration of at least some of the province’s 
booming French-speaking population. As a result, the first wave of colonialism 
in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, which centred on the exploitation of the region’s fur-
bearing species by its Aboriginal population for sale to Euro-Canadian merchants, 
gave way to a second wave, characterized above all by settler colonization. 
Beginning in the late 1830s, French Canadians, primarily from the neighbouring 
Charlevoix region, began colonizing the shores of the Saguenay River before 
continuing on from the 1850s to the lands surrounding Lac St. Jean. Beyond 
settlement, this second period of colonialism was also characterized by a focus on 
forestry, largely directed by extra-regional capital, coupled with locally controlled 
subsistence agriculture. Thus, from the late 1830s, colonialism in Saguenay-Lac 
St. Jean led to the arrival and continued presence of a stationary Euro-Canadian 
population and to the creation of local markets in which agricultural produce, as 
well as furs and manufactured goods, exchanged hands.37
35 The historiography reports several instances of company employees seeking to retain Amerindians at the 
posts at which they had traditionally traded, usually by way of explanations of capitalism’s principle of net 
profit. For a late nineteenth-century example, see Arthur J. Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial 
Age (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), pp. 91-92.
36 For a compelling argument asserting the need to study the state precisely because of this process and 
because of the inseparability of the various socio-political phenomena embodied by the state (such as 
sovereignty, war and diplomacy, administration and bureaucracy, the legal system, democracy or other 
means of accessing political power, and symbolic representations of collective identity), see Jean-Marie 
Fecteau, “Écrire l’histoire de l’État?” Bulletin d’histoire politique, vol. 5, no. 3 (Spring 2007), pp. 109-115. 
For an important recent contribution to the history of the liberal democratic state in Canada, see Jean-
François Constant and Michel Ducharme, eds., Liberalism and Hegemony: Debating the Canadian Liberal 
Revolution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).
37 On the interconnectedness of forestry and agriculture during this period of “colonization proper,” see 
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 Much like the fur trade in the region, colonization along the Saguenay River 
initially began as a relatively large-scale profit-seeking enterprise. In 1838, 
21 shareholders formed the Société de Vingt-et-Un to underwrite the founding of 
commercial logging in the region by a group of Euro-Canadian settlers. Four years 
later, after the shareholders had exhausted their funds, William Price purchased all 
of the sawmills that the colonists of the Vingt-et-Un had built on the Saguenay, 
thereby creating for himself a virtual monopoly on forestry operations in the 
region.38 Also in 1842, the HBC’s monopoly rights to the King’s Posts expired. 
Although the company renewed its lease, Lower Canadian authorities insisted 
on several important changes: while the HBC maintained exclusive rights to the 
region’s fur trade, the government officially opened Saguenay-Lac St. Jean to 
colonization by providing the legal means for settlers to acquire title to lands that 
they had “improved.”39 Thus, by the early 1840s, the King’s Posts were no longer 
off-limits to Euro-Canadian colonization. This change, in turn, led to a radical 
reworking of the political and economic climate of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean.
 The transformation was largely the result of William Price and Company’s 
ascendancy in the region. By 1851, the approximately 4,000 Euro-Canadians living 
along the banks of the Saguenay River depended to various degrees on William 
Price, whether for their income or for their tools and provisions. Much like the 
HBC, William Price and Company maintained a proprietary monetary system, 
issuing bills to a maximum value of £1 for use in paying wages and purchasing 
goods from the company’s stores.40 At mid-century, the lumber company and its 
competitors also sold provisions on credit to their employees, later deducting the 
amount from their wages. In other words, wage-earners, like Aboriginal hunter-
trappers, found themselves locked into a cycle of non-transferable debt that 
diminished their access to more universally acceptable forms of cash. William 
Price and Company reinforced this system by extending mortgages on its 
employees’ lots in exchange for credit at the company store. Despite not owning 
their lands outright, as a result of either having failed to pay the full purchase price 
or illegally occupying lands, forestry workers were thus doubly beholden to the 
company for which they worked.41 A state-commissioned report on the Saguenay 
Normand Séguin, “L’économie agro-forestière : genèse du développement au Saguenay au XIXe siècle,” 
Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française, vol. 29, no. 4 (1976), pp. 559-565; Gérard Bouchard, “Co-
intégration et reproduction de la société rurale : pour un modèle saguenayen de la marginalité,” Recherches 
sociographiques, vol. 29, no. 2-3 (1988), pp. 283-310.
38 Due to the important role played by one of William Price’s associates, Alexis Tremblay, in the formation and 
management of the Société de Vingt-et-Un, Dechêne speculates that Price may have in fact underwritten 
the group’s activities precisely in the hopes of creating for himself such a monopoly (“Les entreprises 
de William Price”). See also Camil Girard and Normand Perron, Histoire du Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean 
(Quebec: Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1995), pp. 120-121.
39 Girard and Perron, Histoire du Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean, p. 119.
40 Dechêne, “Les entreprises de William Price,” p. 85.
41 In 1850, a state surveyor sent to the region reported, “Les employés des chantiers reçoivent en échange 
de leur travail des marchandises et des provisions. Les propriétaires de ces chantiers avancent bien 
libéralement à tous les colons ce dont ils ont besoin; mais ce qu’ils achètent, ils le prennent à crédit, ils 
s’endettent, et comment trouveront-ils le moyen de payer? Aujourd’hui la plus grande partie des habitans 
du Saguenay sont endettés chez les marchands au montant de la valeur de leurs terres qui, quoiqu’elles 
soient la propriété de la Couronne, sont cependant hypothéquées en faveur des créanciers des colons. Sans 
les magasins de Messieurs Price et Compie, la plus grande partie de la population du Saguenay mourrait 
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region, written in 1850, asserted that timber companies were able to exercise this 
stranglehold on the local economy precisely because of a lack of public economic 
infrastructure (including state-issued currency): “Le colon du Saguenay est dans 
une situation exceptionnelle. À une distance considérable de tous les marchés, il 
ne trouve dans le territoire qu’il habite aucun moyen de se procurer, par la vente 
de ses modiques produits s’il en a, l’argent dont il a besoin.”42 By the middle years 
of the nineteenth century, then, the monetary system of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean 
was dominated by private currency, both physical and abstract, that circulated in 
two essentially sealed networks. Despite the two system’s similarities, the HBC’s 
money set itself apart in one very important way. While both helped to ensure 
that their users remained beholden to the corporation that maintained them, only 
beaver currency served to mark the space in which it circulated and the population 
that made use of it in explicitly political terms. The arrival of the colonial state 
changed this, in the process shifting the way in which the British Crown claimed 
sovereignty over the region and the First Nations who resided there.
             Figure 1: Hudson’s Bay Company Posts in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean.
The Transition from Beaver Currency to the Canadian Dollar in Saguenay-
Lac St. Jean
Despite the increasing importance of Price and Company to the region’s money 
supply, the HBC remained central to the monetary system used by the Aboriginal 
population. Between the seventeenth century and the 1840s, Innu hunter-trappers 
used this money at the handful of trading posts scattered throughout Saguenay-
Lac St. Jean. From its acquisition of the lease to the King’s Posts through the end 
de faim.” See Jacques Crémazie, “Rapport spécial sur le Saguenay,” February 20, 1850, in Camil Girard, 
ed., Le Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean en 1850. Rapport spécial de Jacques Crémazie (Jonquière: Les Éditions 
Sagamie/Québec, [1988] 2007), p. 34, electronic version, http://classiques.uqac.ca/collection_histoire_
SLSJ/girard_camil/SLSJ_en_1850/SLSJ_en_1850.html (retrieved January 19, 2010).
42 Ibid.
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of the nineteenth century, the HBC operated a total of four posts in the region: 
Ashuapmouchouan, Chicoutimi, Métabetchouan (or Lake St. John), and Pointe 
Bleue (Mashteuiatsh) (see Figure 1). As a result of internal competition within the 
HBC and, in the case of Chicoutimi, the massive influx of Euro-Canadians, the first 
two posts rapidly lost importance to the Innu economy.43 Although Métabetchouan 
remained open until 1879, Mashteuiatsh quickly became the centre of the HBC’s 
operations in the region following its establishment in 1866.44 This final post owed 
its longevity (it would continue to operate through the middle of the twentieth 
century) to its location on the reserve at Pointe Bleue, making it convenient for the 
HBC’s Innu trading partners.45
 During the whole of the nineteenth century, the fur trade in Saguenay-Lac 
St. Jean, as in much of subarctic Canada, was predicated on two interlocking 
institutions: the annual cycle and the debt system.46 In idealized terms, the 
Amerindian hunter-trapper arrived at the trading post in late summer and purchased, 
on credit denominated in beaver currency, the goods necessary to carry out his 
family’s winter hunt. At the beginning of the following summer, if not before, the 
individual who had received credit returned to the same post, selling his winter 
fur collection to the company to settle his debt. Ideally, each hunter-trapper would 
repay the entire amount owed at the beginning of the summer, thus allowing the 
fur trade company to turn a profit while maintaining the hunter-trapper’s access to 
credit.47 In practice, however, Amerindian hunter-trappers were rarely debt-free.48
43 Métabetchouan provided competition to Chicoutimi while the company’s post at Mistassini did the same for 
Ashuapmouchouan. The HBC closed this second post, approximately 90 miles up the Ashuapmouchouan 
River from Lac St. Jean, in 1850 due to its small clientele (it served no more than eight families). For the post’s 
history, see J. Allan Burgesse, “The Unwanted Post,” Canadian Historical Review, vol. 28, no. 4 (December 
1947), pp. 401-410. As early as 1831, a company employee described Chicoutimi as “a very pleasant and 
comfortable place, but trifling in the fur trade.” See Richard Rae to James Hargrave, October 18, 1831, in G. 
P. de T. Glazebrook, ed., The Hargrave Correspondence, 1821-1843 (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1938), 
pp. 78-79. By 1851, the post had become primarily dedicated to the transshipment of merchandise to and 
from interior posts, and in 1856 the HBC abandoned it. Although it reopened Chicoutimi in 1863, the post 
had by that time long since lost the major role that it had previously played in the Innu economy (Bouchard, 
Le Saguenay des fourrures, pp. 229-230).
44 On Métabetchouan, see Michelle Guitard, Des fourrures pour le Roi au poste de Métabetchouan, Lac Saint-
Jean (Quebec: Ministère des Affaires culturelles, 1984).
45 In fact, the company established the post in direct response to a petition it received from eight Innu men 
asking the HBC to open a post on their new reserve because “the present Post at Metebatchouan is too far 
from the Rivers, on the north side of the Lake, that many of us are accustomed to hunt in and especially 
during winter; when the navigation is closed the present Post is very difficult to access and for many of us 
who leave our families in the woods to come down for a supply of provisions it takes us a long time to reach 
Metebatchouan.” See Library and Archives Canada [hereafter LAC], RG10, vol. 10263, file 377/32-2-5-7, 
reel T-7555, Luke Simeon et al. to Edward Hopkins, October 12, 1866. The Department of Indian Affairs 
accorded the HBC permission to open a post on December 6, 1866 (Newton Flanagan to James Bisset, 
March 20, 1876).
46 On the debt system, see Morantz, “‘So Evil a Practice’.”
47 This “ideal” system did not necessarily function precisely in this manner. For example, the HBC post at 
Métabetchouan occasionally collected debts in the fall rather than at the beginning of the summer. In 1852, 
the post manager wrote: “Traded the hunts of Joseph Sr. & Joseph Junr. this forenoon the former paid his 
debt the latter nearly so.... Simeonish[?] arrived in the evening and traded his hunt he paid his debt” (HBCA, 
B.111/a/4, f. 18v, reel 1M70, Monday, October 11 and Wednesday, October 13, 1852).
48 For instance, during the 1899 Outfit – that is, the fiscal year running from June 1899 through May 1900 
– the HBC post at Moose Factory recorded $3,673.73 in unpaid Indian debt. See HBCA, B. 135/e/34, 
p. 24, reel 1M1257, Appendix 7: Statement of Indian Debts, Outfit 1900 (Amended Copy), Moose Post, 
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 This closed commercial relationship served the interests of fur-trading 
companies (and particularly the HBC) in two ways. First, through the use of a 
pure system of book credits and debits, the HBC stood to make a profit both on 
its fur purchases and its sale of goods and provisions. Indeed, its post managers 
tended to charge higher prices for the goods they sold and to pay lower prices 
for furs than their smaller competitors throughout the subarctic. In this sense, 
the HBC treated the goods it supplied Amerindians as unsecured loans, with the 
difference in market and company prices being equivalent to interest. Second, 
the HBC recognized that the use of freely circulating and universally accepted 
monetary instruments threatened its position in that Amerindian hunter-trappers 
armed with cash might take their consumer business elsewhere.49 However, 
because of the uncertain nature of hunts from one year to the next, the HBC was 
never able to impose a pure credit-for-furs system. If the company wished to 
prevent Amerindians from turning to the competition while keeping them hunting 
for saleable furs rather than for survival, especially following poor years when a 
hunter’s returns alone would not permit him to outfit for the following season, it 
was often forced to sell goods on credit. In spite of its dual desire to conduct trade 
using only abstract monetary means and to retain its clientele, the HBC frequently 
felt that the dangers of allowing its Aboriginal clients to purchase merchandise on 
credit (unpaid debt and the corresponding drain on profitability) outweighed the 
benefits (increased profits due to a captive clientele).50
 Due to the historic and contemporaneous French presence in Saguenay-Lac 
St. Jean, the HBC referred to its money of account in the region as the castor rather 
than the made beaver.51 Although the company’s records are unclear, it would 
appear that at mid-century the Innu and the HBC traded at Métabetchouan based 
on a system of book debits and credits from which circulating media of exchange 
were absent. In spite of transactions that appear to be “pure barter,” the exchange 
of furs for provisions alongside the sale of furs towards the repayment of book 
debt suggests that the Innu and the HBC evaluated all exchange, regardless of 
its specific form, in monetary terms.52 Writing in 1857, David E. Price, the eldest 
Inspection Report on Moose Factory, July 4-11 and August 12-18, 1901.
49 This practice aimed to achieve the maximization of “overplus” – that is, the difference between the HBC’s 
official valuation of furs, on the one hand, and provisions and goods, on the other. By selling merchandise 
at higher rates than those given in official HBC instructions, along with the purchase of furs at lower prices, 
managers could add to their post’s profits. With the advent of cash payments, Amerindian hunter-trappers 
were no longer captive consumers. As a result, the HBC lost, at least to some extent, one of its traditional 
forms of profit. On overplus, see Ray and Freeman, “Give Us Good Measure,” pp. 52, 66-67, 93-95, and 
203-217.
50 Although the HBC had always viewed credit as “a necessary evil,” they were rarely able to discontinue 
it completely. For a brief discussion of credit in a region bordering Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, see Daniel 
Francis and Toby Morantz, Partners in Furs: A History of the Fur Trade in Eastern James Bay, 1600-1870 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1983), pp. 51-53 and 123-124.
51 At the time of the merger, the HBC drew up a series of lists using the castor currency to express the amount 
of debt owed the company by Innu hunters at the King’s Posts. For examples from posts in the Lac St. 
Jean region, see HBCA, E.20/1, f. 213-4, reel 4M127, K. K. Murchison[?], “List of debts due by Indians 
who frequent Ashwabmouson to the Hudson’s Bay Company, 1822,” October 3, 1822; and f. 215, Charles 
Jordan, “List of the debts due by the Indians at the Post on Lake Saint Johns,” October 7, 1822.
52 For example, the Métabetchouan post journal contains the following entries pertaining to “barter”: “A canoe 
arrived in the afternoon from Ashwn. they left immediately with 3 Bags of Flour & ½ Cuvt.[?] Shot[?]” 
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son and a partner of William Price in addition to being the self-appointed Indian 
agent for the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, noted that the HBC continued to 
use the castor at its Métabetchouan post. Through its accounting practices and 
this abstract currency, the company established creditor-debtor relations with its 
clientele, thereby encouraging the sale of furs and the purchase of merchandise.53 
Price asserted that this system of carrying on its business allowed the HBC to 
fleece its Innu trading partners through the conscious manipulation of the value of 
its in-house currency.
The Company here trade by “castors” which they change in value to suit their own 
purposes, from six pence to 2s. 6d., so that no one but the Clerk knows what he 
values them at; as for instance, one day a “castor” represents ¼ lb. of powder and 
next day 1 lb. The Indian sells his furs for so many castors, and more he gets the 
more value he fancies he has obtained for his furs, but as the value of the castor is 
changed to suit the Company’s purpose the poor Indian is “taken-in” without his 
being aware of it.54
Price asserted that, because the HBC alone accepted the castor, this system not 
only encouraged monopolistic exchange over its free market counterpart; it also 
prevented the Innu from learning to appreciate “real” money: “They do not know 
the value of money but in few instances.”55
 This document underscores a shift in both the economic and political make-up 
of the region. Although Price’s vehement critique of the castor is somewhat ironic 
given his own company’s use of a closed monetary system, his ability to make 
this critique as the self-styled Indian agent underscores the HBC’s loss of political 
supremacy in the region. Indeed, prior to mid-century the position of Indian agent 
had not existed even in this informal sense, as the lessees of the King’s Posts 
essentially wielded unchallenged authority over Saguenay-Lac St. Jean and its 
population.56 Price’s letter also points to this changing political climate by calling 
(HBCA, B.111/a/2, f. 23v, reel 1M70, Monday, October 8, 1849); and “Pierre Chemish traded a Beaver 
& Lynx Skin for Flour and left” (B.111/a/4, f. 9v, reel 1M70, Thursday, February 5, 1852). However, the 
journals also note debt-based exchange: “Traded the hunts of Joseph Sr. & Joseph Junr. this forenoon the 
former paid his debt the latter nearly so” (HBCA, B.111/a/4, f. 18v, reel 1M70, Monday, October 11, 1852); 
“Simeonish[?] arrived in the evening and traded his hunt he paid his debt” (Wednesday, October 13, 1852); 
and “Agapie & Son Laurent arrived last evening they traded their hunts this morning, both paid their debts, 
they left immediately afterwards” (f. 27v, reel 1M70, Thursday, May 19, 1853).
53 “Many owe large amounts to the Company, others less, and some of the best hunters have large amounts 
at their credits.” David E. Price to [?], November 14, 1857, Appendix No. 11 in Canada, Journals of the 
Legislative Assembly, Sessional Papers, Appendix 21, “Report of the Special Commissioners Appointed 
on the 8th of September, 1856, to Investigate Indian Affairs in Canada” (Toronto: Stewart Derbishire and 
George Desbarats, 1858).
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid. Of course, Price’s accusations regarding the HBC’s unsavoury business practices are somewhat ironic 
given that his father’s company, in which he himself occupied an important role, made use of very similar 
techniques in dealings with its own employees.
56 The Indian Department remained essentially oblivious to the region and its population from the Conquest 
to the mid-1840s when the Innu of both the North Shore and Saguenay-Lac St. Jean began petitioning the 
governor for the establishment of reserves. In 1845, the secretary of the Indian Department wrote that, in 
reference to the Aboriginal population of the King’s Posts, he “could not discover among the records of the 
Indian Office, any notice or description of the Petitioners, and that they had not at any period been under 
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for the replacement of the castor by “money,” thereby explicitly questioning the 
HBC’s legitimacy in maintaining its own currency. Of course, this critique would 
have been impossible in the absence of a viable alternative. However, by the late 
1850s, an infusion of state-issued cash had begun to alter the region’s monetary 
supply, making an economy based on public rather than private currency feasible 
for the first time.
 The availability of cash was largely the result of the arrival en masse of 
colonists, many of whom competed with the HBC by either trapping furs 
themselves or acting as middlemen.57 Unlike the situation in Rupert’s Land, the 
HBC did not possess a monopoly on exporting furs from Canada, which made 
the company’s operations in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean vulnerable to both small and 
large competitors who could sell either to the merchant-furriers of Quebec City 
and Montreal or to the HBC itself.58 This competition most frequently operated 
as a sideline to other economic activities and therefore necessitated virtually no 
additional expenditure on the part of fur buyers. Furthermore, since the fur trade 
was not the primary industry in which such competitors were engaged, they did 
not seek profit in the same way as the HBC (on the sale of goods as well as on the 
purchase of furs). Rather than maintaining a network of stores, then, small traders 
paid for furs in cash, which the Innu were then free to spend wherever they saw fit.
 Such pressure irrevocably altered the HBC’s monetary regime. Unsurprisingly, 
this system first underwent complete transformation at Chicoutimi. By 1849, if 
not before, the post at Chicoutimi had begun keeping its books in provincial or 
Halifax currency, suggesting that state-backed money had replaced its private 
counterpart in the trade along the Saguenay.59 By the late 1850s, in accord with 
the general movement towards the use of decimal currency in the Canadas, the 
HBC had switched monetary notation once again at the post, this time in favour of 
the dollar system.60 The company’s post at Métabetchouan began accepting state-
issued cash on a limited basis, apparently from Euro-Canadians alone, beginning 
in the mid-1840s.61 However, the post’s records do not clearly state the quantity of 
the protection of the Indian Department” (LAC, RG10, vol. 149, pp. 86383-86384, reel C-11494, Duncan 
C. Napier to James Macauley Higginson, June 30, 1845).
57 This competition was supplemented for a short time by large timber interests. For example, an 1849 
government report notes that the HBC “complain that the Lumberers, as well as the settlers carry on an 
extensive trade with the Indians to the great prejudice of the Compy & the demoralization of the Indians” 
(Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec à Québec, Ministère des Terres et forêts, E 21/5, 2B08-
1401A, Report Book, no. 1. C. E., September 1847 to May 1851, #294, T.B., “Hudson’s Bay Compy at the 
King’s Posts,” pp. 263-264). However, timber companies’ interest in the trade was fleeting.
58 Guitard, Des fourrures pour le Roi, pp. 155-157 and 191.
59 Provincial currency employed pound notation (HBCA, B.36/b/1, f. 7-26, reel 1M175, “Day Book”). 
Although primarily dedicated to the Euro-Canadian trade by this period, some Innu hunter-trappers (such as 
Bazil Jr., Patapish, and François Lake St. Johns) traded at Chicoutimi, thereby participating in this change.
60 Because of the document’s informal nature – it appears to have been used as a means of keeping daily 
accounts before transferring the numbers to formal account books and thus generally only lists the day and 
the month (without the year) – the Chicoutimi “Day Book” does not make entirely clear when this change 
took place. However, by 1859, the post had changed to dollar notation (HBCA, B.36/b/1, f. 20v-26, reel 
1M175, “Day Book”).
61 The post’s Day Book lists a handful of cash sales made during August 1845. However, given the post’s 
standard practice of listing the name of Innu hunter-trappers for all transactions in which they were 
involved, these sales were most likely made to non-Natives (HBCA, B.111/d/1, reel 1M506, f. 37v-38v 
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money or the specific use made of it by the HBC.62 While the company had begun 
occasionally making small cash payments at Métabetchouan by the second half 
of the 1850s, this money went only to Euro-Canadians prior to the early 1860s.63
 While the HBC, recognizing non-proprietary money as a threat to its standing 
in the Saguenay-Lac St. Jean fur trade, attempted to restrict the use of abstract 
and physical currency that it did not control for as long as possible, the Innu, 
also aware of money’s potential power, sought to increase their access to cash. 
Despite the HBC’s pre-eminent role in the region from the 1830s, Amerindians 
actively contributed to the downfall of the castor monetary system. Their role is 
particularly obvious in the use of abstract accounting currency. Beginning in the 
mid-1840s, the HBC post at Métabetchouan kept Innu accounts either in castor 
or in provincial currency. The hunter-trappers appear to have decided themselves 
which money of account was used, as each individual’s sales and purchases were 
always recorded in the same units.64 Through the 1850s, the number of Innu 
trading in provincial currency slowly grew, until, by the beginning of the following 
decade, the HBC accounted for all of its business in the region in dollars.65
 At this point the HBC began to provide the Innu economy with a significant 
amount of cash, suggesting that, in the context of increased competition, Native 
hunter-trappers were able to demand payment in physical rather than abstract 
currency. In 1862, only two years after what was apparently the first monetary 
payment made to an Innu at Métabetchouan, Etienne Jourdain received $30 from 
the HBC, or one-quarter of the annual total (in goods or in currency) earned by the 
average Innu hunter-trapper from the company.66 From the middle of the 1860s 
and 40r-41r, August 2, 3, 6, and 15, 1845). Furthermore, the post’s ledger for Outfits 1846 and 1847, 
giving individualized accounts for all hunter-trappers (whether Aboriginal or Euro-Canadian) trading at 
Métabetchouan, makes no mention of Innu cash purchases (HBCA, B.111/d/2, reel 1M506). By 1849, 
among its regular compliment of hunter-trappers, the HBC made cash sales to Euro-Canadians alone. See 
for example, the purchases made by Joseph Verreaux on June 6, 1849 (HBCA, B.111/d/3, reel 1M506, 
f. 20r).
62 In 1854, the post manager wrote: “I started this morning for Chicoutimi, to bring up the Cash left there by 
Mr. Stewart” (HBCA, B.111/a/4, f. 39v, reel 1M70, Thursday, April 6, 1854).
63 The HBC paid cash to Moyse Beaulieu, a French Canadian, in 1856 and 1857 (HBCA, B.111/d/11a, f. 4r 
and 5r reel 1M506, October 17, 1856, and August 15, 1857).
64 For example, during Outfits 1846 and 1847, the transactions made by Agapie Sr. and Laurent Agapie were 
always recorded in pound notation whereas the transactions of nearly every other Innu were kept in made 
beaver (HBCA, B.111/d/2, reel 1M506). However, one account book, which contains lists of “Indian 
balances” and “Freemen’s balances” at the beginning of Outfits 1847 through 1849 at Métabetchouan, lists 
Agapie Sr.’s and Laurent Agapie’s balances in dollar notation, suggesting that these Innu may have traded 
in either provincial currency, dollars, or both (HBCA, B.111/d/5, reel 1M506, f. 10r, 20r, and 30r). All of the 
“freemen” – that is, Euro-Canadians – traded in provincial currency rather than either the castor or dollars 
(HBCA, B.111/d/5, reel 1M506, f. 10v, 20v, and 30v).
65 The first accounting entries in dollars from the Métabetchouan post “Day Book” date to 1856 (HBCA, 
B.111/d/11a, reel 1M506). However, systematic accounting in decimal currency alone at the post did not 
begin until 1860 (HBCA, B.111/d/12a, reel 1M506).
66 HBCA, B.111/d/15b, f.25r reel 1M507, December 30, 1862. The annual average income, $120, is that 
of the Innu trading at Pointe Bleue during the HBC’s 1866 and 1867 outfits (HBCA, B.329/d/1, reel 
1M575). The first trace found of an Innu having been paid in cash by the HBC at Métabetchouan is from 
December 1860, when the company paid Bazil Junior $1 for furs (HBCA, B.111/d/12b, reel 1M507, f. 15r, 
December 28, 1860). The following year François Jourdain received $2 for furs; in 1863, the HBC paid 
Luke $1 in cash (HBCA, B.111/d/12a, f. 93v, reel 1M507, July 7, 1861; B.111/d/14b, f .105v, reel 1M507, 
November 1, 1863).
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through at least the middle of the 1870s, the amount of money that an “average” Innu 
hunter-trapper might make annually from the HBC varied wildly, but in general 
remained relatively small, ranging from slightly more than $2 to $13. However, 
once the outliers are removed from the data set,67 this “average” individual earned 
roughly $8 in cash annually, although this sum might double in a good year.68 
However, this method of analysis obscures as much as it illuminates. For example, 
the higher average cash payments that the HBC made in 1872, when compared 
to other outfits during the early 1870s, was primarily due to several individuals 
receiving greater amounts in currency than in other years. The highest earner in 
1872, Prospère Cleary, earned nearly twice as much in monetary payments as he 
did for Outfits 1870, 1871, and 1873 combined.69 In addition to Cleary, three other 
Innu hunter-trappers (François Jourdain, Peter of Ashuapmouchouan, and Charles 
Carrot) made significantly more in cash payments in 1872 than in any other year. 
Despite such fluctuations in the amount of cash that the HBC provided to its Innu 
trading partners during the third quarter of the nineteenth century, it is clear that 
monetary authority in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean had shifted from the HBC to the 
state.
 This interpretation is supported by evidence of Innu charitable donations made 
during the period, the amount of which suggests that they had access to far more 
cash than company records alone indicate. In 1858, shortly after state-issued 
cash had first appeared in the HBC trade on Lac St. Jean (although at this time 
it was still restricted to non-Aboriginal trappers), the Innu provided the visiting 
Oblate missionary with £127 with which he was to renovate the small chapel 
at Métabetchouan.70 Five years later, Flavien Durocher, the Oblate missionary 
most active among the Lac St. Jean Innu during the nineteenth century, wrote 
concerning a hunter-trapper who had converted to Catholicism and sought 
literally to pay for his sins: “Ce bon Antoine, le meilleur des chasseurs du lac, le 
bénoni71 des traiteurs, voulut racheter son péché par l’aumône; à la collecte que 
je fis à la fin de la Mission pour la chapelle, il me donna, en billets de banque, la 
somme de 30 piastres.”72 Moreover, Antoine was not alone; between 1860 and 
1863, the “quarante ou cinquante familles du lac” contributed more than $1,200 
67 For example, in Outfit 1866, the HBC paid Etienne a total of $97.03 in cash for his furs. Although he also 
earned a relatively substantial amount of currency during the following year ($30), the size of the payment 
he received in 1866 was certainly anomalous (HBCA, B.329/d/1, reel 1M575). To diminish the standard 
deviation and thereby augment the reliability of resulting average, the highest and lowest sums of currency 
earned by any Innu during the outfits in question (1866, 1867, and 1870 through 1873) were not used when 
calculating the average.
68 The “standard” years for which data has been analysed include 1867, 1870, 1871, and 1873. The average 
significantly increased to approximately $11 in 1872 and rose to roughly $15 in 1866 (HBCA, B.329/d/1, 
reel 1M575 and B.329/d/5, 1M575).
69 In 1872, the HBC paid Cleary $135.65, whereas he made a total of $83.80 in the other three years (HBCA, 
B.329/d/5, 1M575).
70 Gaston Carrière, Histoire documentaire de la Congrégation des Missionnaires Oblats de Marie-Immaculée 
dans l’Est du Canada, vol. 3 (Ottawa: Éditions de l’Université d’Ottawa, 1961), p. 281.
71 “Benoni” is a Hebrew word meaning “son of my sorrow” or “son of my pain.”
72 Quoted in Gaston Carrière, Histoire documentaire de la Congrégation des Missionnaires Oblats de Marie-
Immaculée dans l’Est du Canada, vol. 8 (Ottawa: Éditions de l’Université d’Ottawa, 1969), p. 113.
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to the renovation of their chapel at Métabetchouan.73 In other words, each year 
from 1860 through 1863 the Innu provided the church with roughly the equivalent 
of what they earned in cash from the HBC, suggesting that their income included 
money from other sources as well.74
 The HBC’s resistance to the use of state-issued cash is also suggested by the 
continued use of local, informal debt – whether transferable or not – in Saguenay-
Lac St. Jean. In addition to its official form (notes and coins), the Canadian dollar 
circulated as drafts and bons – that is, handwritten and signed notes acknowledging 
a monetary obligation on the part of the issuer to the holder.75 The HBC used this 
method of payment as it had traditionally used book debt to earn profit from both 
the purchase of furs and the sale goods (drafts were only accepted as payment at 
company posts). However, the frequency with which the HBC issued circulating 
credit in the form of bons appears to have diminished during the period.76 At 
the same time, the company occasionally collaborated with William Price and 
Company, by then one of the HBC’s chief clients in the region, perhaps to prevent 
its Innu trading partners from using cash in transactions with the company’s 
rivals.77 Thus, at least during the 1860s and 1870s, private forms of transferable 
debt continued to provide the HBC with an effective means of limiting the Innu’s 
ability to conduct business elsewhere than at its posts.
 The HBC’s continued use of purely abstract, book-based money in Saguenay-
Lac St. Jean also points to its resistance to state-issued cash, caused primarily by 
the profitability associated with the captive clientele typical of truck systems. Even 
though the Innu were, in the words of their Indian agent, “honorable in paying 
their debts,” the company had stopped extending credit at its Lac St. Jean posts by 
the late 1870s.78 James Bissett, the HBC’s chief factor at Montreal, asserted that, 
because the company no longer needed to underwrite unpaid advances, it could 
“afford to sell goods cheaper than when giving them out on credit.”79 Although 
73 Ibid.
74 This annual average ($297.50) is based on the total cash the HBC paid the Innu at Pointe Bleue during 
Outfits 1866, 1867, and 1870 through 1873 (HBCA, B.329/d/1, reel 1M575 and B.329/d/5, reel 1M575).
75 For the HBC, drafts were a simple means of providing payment for individuals elsewhere than at a local 
post. For example, the post manager at Métabetchouan ordered payment of a surveyor at Chicoutimi 
(HBCA, B.36/z/2, f. 4, reel 1M1657, Simon Ross, Draft for $30.00 for P. Dumais, January 5, 1876). For 
other examples of drafts and bons from the mid-1870s, see HBCA, B.36/z/2, reel 1M1657. For a list of 
drafts drawn at Métabetchouan on Chicoutimi, some payable to Innu, see HBCA, B.111/d/4, reel 1M506, 
f. 44v-45v.
76 This is the author’s interpretation and is admittedly based on an archival record in which bons are quite 
rare. For an example of this form of payment, made for $34.16 to Charles Robertson in 1861, see HBCA, 
B.111/d/12a, f. 63v, reel 1M507, May 29, 1861.
77 In 1868, the company paid Price & Co. $10, subtracting the amount from what the HBC owed Thomas 
Bacon (HBCA, B.329/d/17, f. 9r, reel 1M575, November 11, 1868). By 1863, Price and Company had 
become one of the HBC’s main clients at Métabetchouan (Guitard, Des fourrures pour le Roi, pp. 191-192).
78 L. E. Otis, Report on the Lake St. John Agency, October 26, 1878, in Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1878, 
p. 35. This comment echoes another, made over 20 years earlier, by David Price: “they [the Innu] are 
generally strictly honest that they return with their furs to the trading posts, where they received advances.” 
See David E. Price to [?], November 14, 1857, Appendix No. 11 in Canada, Journals of the Legislative 
Assembly, Sessional Papers, Appendix 21, “Report of the Special Commissioners Appointed on the 8th of 
September, 1856, to Investigate Indian Affairs in Canada” (Toronto: Stewart Derbishire and George 
Desbarats, 1858), n.p.
79 HBCA, B.111/c/2, reel 1MB72, James Bissett to Newton Flanagan, September 22, 1879.
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this change in policy proved untenable and had been definitively abandoned by 
the end of the following decade, the HBC’s practice of refusing credit most likely 
played a part in the decision of certain Innu to employ cash when paying for 
a portion of the merchandise they purchased at Mashteuiatsh.80 However, such 
cash expenditure remained marginal, most likely because the Innu sought hard 
currency to make purchases from retailers who, unlike the HBC, did not deal in 
book credits/debits and who therefore sold goods at lower prices.
 In the 1880s, the company’s managers realized that currency had become a 
permanent part of business with the Innu. From this point, the question changed 
from whether to use money to how best to control it.81 By the end of that decade, 
the HBC had once more begun extending credit to Innu hunter-trappers at 
Mashteuiatsh. Moreover, the company provided a portion of this credit in cash, 
something that it had not previously done. In 1890, the inspector for the HBC’s 
Saguenay District described the potentially hazardous outcome of this system. 
He asserted that cash advances to the Innu constituted a very real risk to the 
company’s bottom-line, “especially in this District where such inducements are 
held out [by competitors] to Indians to be dishonest.” However, he agreed with 
the post manager at Mashteuiatsh who felt that “the effect of abolishing all cash 
advances to Indians would be disastrous, and I have no doubt that to a certain 
extent he is right, as they are bound to have cash, and if not supplied will keep 
back furs to obtain it from others.”82
 This policy was clearly directed at securing Innu trade in what was proving 
to be a particularly challenging environment for the company. By the 1890s, 
colonization on the shores of Lac St. Jean had significantly increased the size of 
the region’s Euro-Canadian population. The growth of towns in the immediate 
vicinity of Mashteuiatsh created new outlets for the sale of furs, apparently raising 
prices and injecting large amounts of money into the Innu economy.83 At the same 
time, retailers in these towns proved eager to sell merchandise to Amerindians 
in exchange for cash. In 1898, J. B. Ross, an HBC employee in the Saguenay 
District, informed the company’s Pointe Bleue manager that “the Indians on their 
way to this Post dispose of a great many furs for cash to the storekeepers.”84 The 
HBC responded to its local cash-paying competition by dramatically increasing 
the amount of currency it employed when purchasing furs from the Innu. On 
May 31, 1901 alone, the HBC post at Pointe Bleue paid Innu hunter-trappers at 
least $255.32 in cash (and perhaps as much as $389.14).85
80 The earliest cash sales found at Pointe Bleue date from 1883. For examples, see the sales made in June 1883 
to Old Philip, David Philip, Charles Jourdain, Charles Robertson, George Metabeg, and Bazil Ousinithlon 
(HBCA, B.329/a/2, reel 1M1018, f. 21r-26r).
81 For a discussion of how to make the company’s prices at Mashteuiatsh more competitive, thereby 
theoretically diminishing the amount of cash necessary to purchase furs, see HBCA, B.329/e/2, reel 
1M1258, J. A. Wilson, “Post Report – Pointe Bleue,” October 18, 1889.
82 HBCA, B.329/e/3, p. 14, reel 1M1258, P. McKenzie, “Inspection Report: Pointe Bleue Post, Saguenay 
District,” April 21, 1890 (emphasis in original).
83 Unfortunately, none of these new fur traders left records of their activities. As a result, it is necessary to rely 
on statements made by HBC employees, which rarely contain any quantitative information.
84 HBCA, B.329/a/4, reel 1M1019, f. 9v, Sunday, May 29, 1898.
85 The lower number represents the total number of cash payments made by the HBC where the recipient is 
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Conclusion
The wide-scale colonization of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean altered the monetary 
landscape by introducing new trading partners and currencies, simultaneously 
pushing the HBC to retreat in the face of a booming settler population. As a result, 
the Innu integrated their economic activity into the networks imported and created 
by their new Euro-Canadian neighbours, in the process diminishing the economic 
and political power of the HBC. The slow creation of infrastructure – the markets 
and roads that were still largely lacking at mid-century – brought about changes in 
the region’s monetary system. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Innu had 
free access to the Canadian dollar, both in its physical and abstract forms, making 
use of it with the HBC as well as with its competitors. As a result, the Saguenay-
Lac St. Jean Innu were no longer beholden to the company in the same way as 
they had previously been, thereby gaining at least a measure of economic and 
political independence. However, during the same period that the HBC’s hold on 
the region and its Aboriginal population slipped, the state, primarily through the 
Department of Indian Affairs, became increasingly involved in the everyday lives 
of the Innu through the creation of reserves and the imposition of band councils.86 
Thus the shift from one monetary regime to another underscores the changing 
ways in which the British Empire and the young Canadian nation-state managed 
the territory to which they laid claim and its inhabitants, making it clear that the 
HBC, like chartered trading companies elsewhere, acted as an agent of empire. 
Moreover, this shift also points to the problematic nature of the present-day 
assertion of state sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples, in particular in the province 
of Quebec. Indeed, whereas certain authors, adopting the position developed by the 
state since the eighteenth century, assert the absence of Aboriginal title to Quebec 
as a result of pre-Conquest French policy, such claims mask far more complicated 
historical processes of state formation and the establishment of territorial control 
typified by the changing monetary system in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean.87
 Money, then, marked the subarctic in geopolitical terms, as the dollar’s 
replacement of beaver currency paralleled the state’s displacement of the 
HBC’s central political role. Settler colonialism rolled into Saguenay-Lac 
St. Jean, bringing first Halifax currency and ultimately the Canadian dollar and 
the federal and provincial states with it. Neighbouring Aboriginal peoples who 
neither received treaty annuities from the state nor lived in close proximity to 
clearly identified. The additional $133.82 included in the higher figure is the sum of cash payments made on 
the same day for which the recipient is not identified. The HBC records identify six Innu as having shared 
the $255.32 (HBCA, B.329/a/4, reel 1M1019, f. 25r-27r, May 3, 1901).
86 Alain Beulieu and Stéphanie Béreau, “L’État canadien et la transformation du pouvoir politique autochtone : 
le cas de Pointe-Bleue, 1876-1950,” 60e Congrès de l’Institut d’histoire de l’Amérique française, Royal 
Military College of Canada (Kingston), October 18-20, 2007.
87 For a recent study that asserts, in completely untenable fashion, the historical sovereignty of the King of 
France to a large part of Quebec in an effort to reject present-day territorial claims by several First Nations, 
see Michel Lavoie, Le Domaine du roi, 1652-1859. Souveraineté, contrôle, mainmise, propriété, possession, 
exploitation (Sillery, QC: Septentrion, 2010). For a nuanced study of the initial historical development of 
such claims on the part of the state, see Alain Beaulieu, “‘An equitable right to be compensated’: The 
Dispossession of the Aboriginal Peoples of Quebec and the Emergence of a New Legal Rationale (1760-
1860),” Canadian Historical Review, vol. 94, no. 1 (March 2013), pp. 1-27.
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Euro-Canadian colonization continued to use the made beaver well after the Innu 
had begun employing the dollar.88 In this sense, an analysis of money provides 
insight into the diverse ways in which Europeans and their descendants exercised 
control over vast areas of northern North America. Whereas colonialism in the 
St. Lawrence valley and the lower Great Lakes had long pushed First Nations to 
the economic and political periphery, the Innu constituted Saguenay-Lac St. Jean’s 
predominant population through the middle of the nineteenth century. Moreover, 
prior to this point, the state had held relatively little sway in the region as the 
HBC occupied political centre stage through its control of networks of exchange 
and its maintenance of several state-like institutions. Despite this preponderant 
role, Amerindians, in collaboration with their Euro-Canadian neighbours, 
proved capable of overturning the company’s monetary regime, thereby actively 
contributing to the process by which the region came to be identified with southern 
polities rather than overseas commercial and political empire.
88 For example, the Cree who traded at Mistassini, an HBC post located to the north of Lac St. Jean, made use 
of beaver currency into the twentieth century. In 1908, the post manager wrote: “Joseph Mittawasha arrived 
yesterday he brought 160 Mad Beav worth” (HBCA, B.133/a/63, f. 22v, reel 1MA41, Thursday, January 16, 
1908).
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